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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in - the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Plaintiff replies to the Brief of Appellees, Wilford H. 
Hansen Stone Quarries, Inc., a Utah corporation (hereinafter 
referred to as "Stone Quarries" or "Corporate defendant") and 
Sharron Killion (hereinafter referred to as "Killion") (the 
defendants, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen are 
hereinafter referred to as "Jensens"), as follows, to-wit: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE 
EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF 
ITS ASSETS WITHOUT TIME LIMITATION, AND THE ASSETS DO NOT 
AUTOMATICALLY PASS TO THE SHAREHOLDERS BY OPERATION OF LAW AT 
DISSOLUTION. 
The first argument of Stone Quarries and Killion seems to 
be that dissolution of plaintiff passed title automatically to its 
Case No. 950705-CA 
Priority (15) 
shareholders at dissolution, thus going beyond even what defendants 
Jensen argue. 
Plaintiff argues that plaintiff has not yet been 
dissolved, but that even if it has been, the title to the assets 
of the dissolved corporation remain in the corporation. This 
entire subject is dealt with at length in plaintiff's original 
brief and brief in Reply to the brief of Jensens, and those 
arguments are adopted at this point. 
Stone Quarries and Killion do raise one new item. They 
seem to be concerned that such a conveyance by operation of law 
does not violate the statute of frauds. We think this is a non-
issue. The Utah statute of frauds is after all a statute. A 
number of limitations or exceptions are already expressly spelled 
out in the statute. If Utah wanted to create another exception 
thereto by a statute declaring that upon dissolution the assets of 
a corporation pass by operation of law to its shareholders, it 
could no doubt do so, even if it created a "mess." Such a statute 
would simply be another exception to the statute of frauds. 
The point is however that Utah has not done so. In fact 
Utah has done just the opposite. By statute the assets do not pass 
to the shareholders, and therefore there is no statute of frauds 
issue here. 
Stone Quarries and Killion in their Statement of Facts 
(at page 7 of their brief) note that plaintiff's Articles of 
Dissolution stated that the property and assets of plaintiff "have 
been distributed among its shareholders," and concludes therefrom 
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that the shareholders "received the property." It is undisputed 
that the subject mining claims were never in fact transferred by 
the corporation to the shareholders. The defendants argue that the 
shareholders got title by operation of law, but no one claims that 
the corporation itself deeded the subject mining claims to its 
shareholders. The subject mining claims were obviously overlooked, 
and there was never any conveyance of the subject mining claims out 
of the corporation, and the aforesaid corporate statement was 
therefore erroneous. The statement was made by officers of the 
company. It is not contractual. There is no acknowledgment by the 
shareholders that they received the property. Even if the 
shareholders had in fact receipted for the property, it is always 
permissible to go behind a receipt or an acknowledgment of 
consideration to show lack of consideration or failure to receive 
that which is shown in the receipt. See Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 
656 P2d 454 (Utah 1982). The subject mining claims were not 
conveyed by plaintiff to its shareholders. 
Furthermore, there is no allegation that Stone Quarries 
and Killion relied upon any such corporate statement or that they 
even knew about it. At page 11 of their brief defendants, Stone 
Quarries and Killion assert that they purchased the subject mining 
claims from "a 'new' Salt Lake Investment Company on March 7, 
1990, based on the assumption that the 'old7 Salt Lake Investment 
Company (plaintiff) was dissolved." That assertion carefully 
avoids the use of the work "reliance." It uses "assumption" 
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instead. In addition, the said assertion makes no sense. "New" 
and "old" in and of themselves make no difference. The only 
question is who holds title. Just because the old corporation is 
dissolved doesn't give the new one title. There is no connection 
between the two corporations. If Stone Quarries and Killion are 
relying upon the shareholders owning the assets, why do they go to 
any corporation new or old to seek title? If Stone Quarries and 
Killion thought that the shareholders owned the property, why would 
they pay $12,000 to a corporation for a deed. Stone Quarries and 
Killion argue that assets pass to shareholders immediately upon 
dissolution. If this were so, or even if they believed it to be 
so, why were they willing to pay a corporation - any corporation -
anything, let alone $12,000 for quit claim deeds (especially when 
the corporation is a total stranger to title) . The fact that Stone 
Quarries and Killion sought title from a corporation, demolishes 
any claim that Stone Quarries and Killion in any way relied upon 
title being vested in any shareholders. It must be obvious that 
there was no reliance upon any corporate statement that assets had 
been distributed to shareholders. Furthermore, dissolution or lack 
of it can in law have nothing to do with Stone Quarries and Killion 
approaching the new corporation, because "reliance" must in any 
case be reasonable, and they have shown no grounds upon which a 
reasonable person would suppose that he or she could acquire title 
from a corporation that is a total stranger to the title. How can 
there be reasonable reliance in such conduct? 
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There was no reliance. This was a scheme to "appear" to 
obtain title. In order to get the property in the name of Killion 
of record, Stone Quarries and Killion had to have a deed from a 
grantor with the name of "Salt Lake Investment Company." They 
correctly assumed that the county recorder upon receiving a deed 
from a grantor with the name of Salt Lake Investment Company would 
not question whether it was the original Salt Lake Investment 
Company or another corporation with the same name. Is this 
illegal? Is this fraud? Defendants Stone Quarries and Killion at 
page 8 of their brief accuse plaintiff of "bad faith" for bringing 
this action. We submit that this action involves legitimate 
issues, which any attorney would be entitle to present to a court 
of law. We wonder if tricking the county recorder and attempting 
to trick plaintiff out of its assets isn't however bad faith. 
Let's view it in terms of a hypothetical using fictitious 
names. Let us assume that a man named John Smith owns Blackacre. 
Let us assume that another man named John Smith, who does not own 
Blackacre, nevertheless makes out a quit claim deed to Blackacre 
naming Harry Jones as grantee for a consideration of $12,000, and 
Harry Jones knows that his grantor is a different person from the 
one that owns Blackacre. Nevertheless, Harry Jones has paid some 
really big money to get this spurious deed, so he intends to use 
it, and he presents the deed to the county recorder. He does not 
tell the recorder that the grantor is a stranger to the title. He 
hands the deed to the recorder in the hope that the recorder will 
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assume that the John Smith, who appears as owner, and the John 
Smith on the quit claim deed are the same person. If the recorder 
knew otherwise, he or she would not knowingly accept the deed, or 
at least would not change the ownership records to show Harry Jones 
as owner based on this spurious deed. 
Once again is there fraud involved here? If Harry Jones 
did not know there were two John Smiths, then there would be no 
fraud, but the deed would still be invalid. If however he knew the 
true facts is it fraud? 
Well, we don't need to answer that because the deed is 
invalid either way, and that is really all that matters. Stone 
Quarries and Killion acquired title from a totally different Salt 
Lake Investment Company, one that had no connection with plaintiff, 
and did not in any way succeed to the assets of the first one. It 
was only used by Stone Quarries and Killion to take advantage of 
the coincidence in the names. The second Salt Lake Investment 
Company never owned any interest in the subject mining claims. 
Perhaps what Stone Quarries and Killion did, may be determined to 
be fraudulent. But whether it is or not, and whether Stone 
Quarries and Killion knew the true facts or not, is all irrelevant 
on this issue. They could not and did not get a good title from a 
grantor who did not have any title to give. 
The lower court never got to the merits of this case, and 
plaintiff should have its day in court with regard to all of these 
issues. 
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POINT 2. PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO SUE TO DEFEND ITS 
ASSETS. 
The second point of defendants, Stone Quarries and 
Killion, is that plaintiff lacks standing to sue or be sued. We 
have dealt with this in our original brief and in our Reply to the 
brief of Jensens, and those arguments are adopted at this point. 
POINT 3. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES ARE 
NOT INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION. 
Even if they existed, equitable defenses will not be 
accorded to those who lack clean hands. Plaintiff is entitled to 
its day in court on the issue of the clean hands of defendants. 
Plaintiff claims that Jensens obtained quitclaim deeds by fraud and 
claims that Stone Quarries and Killion likewise obtained deeds by 
means that are morally tainted, if not outright fraudulent and 
illegal. The claimed equitable defenses are not available. The 
alleged legal and equitable defenses are also not available for 
additional reasons: 
1. ESTOPPEL 
Estoppel is not an issue. Plaintiff claims that Stone 
Quarries and Killion had a careful title search done, and that they 
knew the true facts as to which Salt Lake Investment Company owned 
the title, and that they made the deliberate choice to acquire 
deeds from a Salt Lake Investment Company which did not own even a 
vestige of title and never did own such. There was no reliance on 
anything done by plaintiff. In fact no one would have known what 
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Stone Quarries and Killion had done, if Jensens had not obtained 
the fraudulent quit claim deeds from plaintiff's shareholders. 
When Jensens obtained those deeds, Stone Quarries and Killion's 
felt they needed to approach plaintiff and in so doing had to 
disclose the fact that plaintiff still owned the tracts in 
question. 
2. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LACHES. Statute of 
limitations and laches are not involved in this action. Jensens 
did not even purportedly acquire any interest in the subject 
property until October, 1993, when the fraudulent quit claim deeds 
were obtained. We believe that even the three years statute of 
limitations for fraud has been tolled by the filing of this action, 
but even if that were not so, the three years has still not 
elapsed. 
Defendants Stone Quarries and Killion claim under a quit 
claim deed acquired in 1990. As we have seen these deeds are from 
a Salt Lake Investment Company which was a complete stranger to 
title, and Stone Quarries and Killion cannot claim anything under 
this spurious deed no matter how many years elapse. Defendants 
Stone Quarries and Killion also assert a claim for adverse 
possession. No specifics are alleged, but presumably this claim 
runs from 1990 as well. Seven years adverse possession are 
necessary and only five years have elapsed from their appearance on 
the scene to the commencement of this action, so no statute has yet 
run which bars plaintiff's defense to a claim of adverse 
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possession. 
There are numerous hurdles to claiming title by adverse 
possession. The possession must be open, notorious and adverse for 
7 years without interruption. During that entire time, the taxes 
must be paid without interruption. Finally the possession for all 
7 years must meet the requirements of Section 78-12-11 UCA, if the 
claim is not under color of title, or it must meet the requirements 
of Section 78-12-9 UCA if the claim is under color of title. A 
spurious deed is not color of title, but in any event this action 
was commenced within 7 years after any of the deeds were obtained, 
so there is not going to be any adverse possession under color of 
title in this action. The burden of proving possession under color 
of title is much easier because it appears that one only has to 
prove that the property was used for the "ordinary use of the 
occupant" for 7 years without interruption. Without color of 
title, the burden is difficult indeed, and requires a "substantial 
enclosure" for 7 years without interruption, or that the land be 
"cultivated or improved" for 7 years without interruption, or that 
irrigation expenditures of at least $5.00 per acre be shown for 7 
years without interruption. We believe that no defendant can show 
any such possession. In any event, plaintiff is entitled to its 
day in court on all of these issues, and the court cannot rule that 
plaintiff cannot recover under any facts which it may be able to 
prove. See Russell v. Park City Utah Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 184, 
506 P.2d 1274 (1973). 
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Even assuming that plaintiff was dissolved 30 years ago, 
that 30 years period is another non-issue and is nothing but a red 
herring. Let us illustrate. 
Assume that John Doe bought a vacant lot 35 years ago 
thinking that he would some day build a barn on it. He died 5 
years later survived by two sons. There is no probate or 
proceedings for heirship. Quit claim deeds (whether valid or 
invalid) relating to this property are acquired by third parties in 
1990 and 1993 respectively. Does the fact that John Doe and his 
estate/heirs owned the property for 35 years (30 of it since his 
death) have any bearing on the validity of the quit claim deeds or 
on the validity of a claim for adverse possession? The length of 
time John Doe or his sons have owned the property is irrelevant. 
It could be 10 years, 30 years or 60 years. 
Now when "John Doe" is a dissolved corporation owning an 
undistributed piece of property for let us say 5 years before the 
corporation is dissolved and for 30 years after dissolution, how 
does that change the situation? Whether the corporation owns its 
assets (as plaintiff claims) or whether the shareholders own the 
assets by operation of law, in either case, the lapse of time 
creates no more defenses for the quit claim deed claimants where 
the owners are persons than where a corporation is involved. 
The only time period which concerns the court is the 
time period beginning with the time plaintiff's title comes under 
attack from defendants, which is 1990 and 1993 and the years 
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following, and the 30 year period is irrelevant. Plaintiff had no 
duty to sue defendants or anyone else until plaintiff's title was 
attacked. 
Where titles are concerned, a long period of time of 30 
or more years in and of itself means nothing. If we suppose that 
defendants had legitimately started to adverse plaintiff's title 
beginning 30 years ago, but "slept on their rights" and never got 
around to quieting title, would anyone say that because "records 
have certainly been lost [and] memories faded" that defendants 
cannot go back 30 years with their proof? We think not. 
Even if the claim of adverse possession of defendants 
Stone Quarries and Killion runs for some years before 1990, unless 
it was completed by then, Stone Quarries and Killion will not be 
able to use the years since 1990 as part of the required 7 years 
period, because while they are claiming under the owner (even if 
falsely so claiming) they cannot by definition be claiming 
adversely to it. If they are claiming under the owner (even 
falsely) they cannot be claiming adversely to the owner. During 
the years they have attempted by trickery to appear to be 
successors to and in privity with the true owner, they cannot claim 
adversely as well. However that may be, it is an issue which 
remains to be tried, and which clearly forecloses summary judgment. 
Defendants Stone Quarries and Killion claim that 
plaintiff "slumbered" on its rights and is subject to the defense 
of laches as a matter of law. They claim that plaintiff delayed 
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bring this suit to the prejudice of defendants. Plaintiff did not 
know it had a claim until just before this suit was filed. The 
fact that it still owned the subject claims was brought to the 
attention of plaintiff when it was contacted by Stone Quarries and 
Killion shortly before this action was commenced. One cannot 
slumber on unknown rights. At the very least its knowledge is an 
issue of fact. Plaintiff did not knowingly procrastinate in this 
matter. When it was advised of the true facts, this action was 
promptly commenced. Furthermore, no one was injured or misled by 
any inaction of plaintiff. Stone Quarries and Killion claim from 
1990, and this suit was commenced within the 7 year period for 
adverse possession following 1990. Jensens only claim from 1993, 
and this action was commenced within about 18 months of their 
appearance on the scene. There has been no intentional or knowing 
delay, and there has been no showing of prejudice whatever. 
The fact is that all defendants knew the true facts long 
before plaintiff, and all attempted to take advantage of that 
knowledge to defraud plaintiff, and this should not be permitted. 
It is clear that there is no legitimate issue of statute of 
limitations or laches in this case. 
Plaintiff is entitled to its day in court on the validity 
of the quit claim deeds and on the validity of the claim of adverse 
possession. 
Stone Quarries and Killion at page 6 of their brief state 
that the lower court "reviewed legal and equitable defenses" 
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against plaintiff. The court did discuss the statutes of 
limitation, but did not discuss laches or estoppel. The court 
discussed statutes of limitation in the light of "winding up." The 
court said "Nearly every single statue of limitations would have 
run in such a time [30 years]..." Plaintiff's assert that winding 
up has no time limitation, and if we are correct in that it 
disposes of this issue in any event. Nevertheless, as we have 
noted, the court erroneously considered the statutes of limitation 
in the light of the 30 years since the alleged dissolution. It 
erroneously assumed that all statues of limitation which could be 
relevant to this law suit had to commence 30 years ago. As we have 
shown this is of course not the case. Statutes of limitation must 
be viewed in the light of the time of the attack against the title 
of plaintiff. Applicable statutes of limitation had not run as of 
the time of the commencement of this action. 
Stone Quarries and Killion also state at page 6 of their 
brief, that: "Permitting Salt Lake Investment Company to go 
forward would result in costly litigation which would likely 
produce a similar outcome." (Emphasis added.) "Likely" may be the 
test for a preliminary injunction, but it is not the test for a 
summary judgment. To sustain a summary judgment, the court's job 
is not to determine what the "likely" outcome will be. It must 
determine as a matter of law that there are no facts - no fact 
situation - under which plaintiff could recover. See Russell v. 
Park City Utah Corporation, supra. The facts have never been 
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developed in this case, so it certainly cannot be said that 
plaintiff cannot recover under any facts which it may be able to 
prove within the pleadings, and this case should be returned to the 
lower court for complete discovery and trial. 
We urge the court to discard the non-issues which have 
been raised in order to shield defendants from their own 
wrongdoing, and to allow this matter to be tried on the merits 
without delay. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment of the 
District Court should be reversed, and this action remanded for 
trial on all issues and as to all parties. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument of this 
appeal. 
Dated this day of July, 1996. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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